Europe’s gas market has shifted since the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine, following a period in which liberalised gas markets, diversified suppliers and rules-based infrastructure were expected to ensure stability. The restructuring that followed included redrawn supply routes and the rapid build-out of LNG capacity. For Western and Northern Europe, the transition has largely stabilised. South-East Europe remains exposed to the gap between older dependence patterns and newer uncertainty.
From pipeline confidence to LNG flexibility
Europe’s current gas system is described as relying on diversification, LNG flexibility, European solidarity mechanisms and emergency resilience frameworks. Gas is treated as a factor in continental security rather than only a commodity for consumption. In South-East Europe, the legacy of single-supplier logic, politically influenced pricing models and infrastructure chains still affects vulnerability and decision-making. The same crisis that highlighted these risks also drove a strategic shift in the region.
New LNG terminals in Greece are part of that change, alongside expanded use of the Revithoussa terminal. The emergence of Alexandroupolis is also cited as a development affecting regional supply options. Interest in Ionian-Adriatic corridors, increased North-South integration and reinforcement of interconnectors have been described as rewriting energy geography across the Balkans. The region is increasingly positioned within Europe’s resilience logic rather than only receiving outcomes from pipeline politics.
Interdependence between SEE and EU gas security
The source material frames South-East Europe and the European Union as deeply interdependent on gas in multiple roles. Europe is said to depend on SEE as a transit zone, a flexibility region and a security buffer, with regional market stability affecting continental risk exposure. In return, SEE depends on the EU for infrastructure financing, diversification routes, regulatory frameworks and coordinated market confidence. It also points to geopolitical cover as part of that relationship.
The text links this interdependence to the need for southeastern flank security within Europe’s credibility. It also describes country-level differences as shaping how exposure is transmitted across borders. Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary and Romania are each presented with distinct starting points and policy implications for diversification and resilience. Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Montenegro are then addressed in terms of infrastructure constraints or integration potential.
Country developments: Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece
Serbia is described as balancing supply security, affordability and avoidance of industrial shock while moving away from single-source reliance. The material notes that Serbia has long relied on Russian gas via established routes and now operates in an environment where continuity cannot be assumed. It highlights interconnector development, relevance of regional storage capacity and connections toward Hungary, Bulgaria and Adriatic architecture as factors shaping whether Serbia remains in dependency logic or becomes more resilient through hedging. These elements are presented as policy choices rather than optional measures.
Bulgaria is cited as having been forced into diversification after exposure to Russian supply disruptions. The text points to an interconnector with Greece and access to new LNG-based gas as reshaping Bulgaria’s position. It also describes Bulgaria as politically sensitive within European gas flows, with decisions taken in Sofia affecting beyond national borders. In this framing, Bulgaria can act either as a vulnerability transmitter when unstable or as a stabiliser when aligned with broader arrangements.
Greece is presented as one of the region’s most proactive energy actors, with gas developments alongside electricity reform. LNG infrastructure development is described as creating both national resilience and regional relevance for SEE diversification. Greece is characterised not only as an importer but increasingly as an enabler of regional supply options. The text ties this role to Alexandroupolis and associated transmission capacity if they continue to mature.
Hungary, Romania and governance constraints across the Balkans
Hungary is described as structurally gas-dependent while maintaining political caution despite physical interconnections that could support diversification. Its gas policy is characterised as linked to political calculus and a pragmatic security priority focused on securing volumes at stable prices. The material says this approach influences regional gas behaviour by shaping negotiation stances and long-term infrastructure logic. It also frames Hungary’s direction as relevant to whether diversification normalises or whether crisis memory fading allows drift back toward dependency comfort.
Romania is described as structurally advantaged compared with peers due to domestic production capabilities and Black Sea potential. The text says Romania has the possibility to reduce exposure not only through diversification but also through indigenous production strength. It links potential outcomes to how fully production opportunities are maximised while maintaining European alignment. If administrative paralysis or political hesitancy limits progress, it says a defining chance would be lost.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is described as deeply exposed due to limited infrastructure and political fragmentation. The material states that internal governance challenges translate directly into gas insecurity. Without systemic coherence, it says gas risks becoming another instrument trapped inside political division rather than functioning as a strategic national asset.
Northern Macedonia, Montenegro and regional integration pathways
North Macedonia is presented with a direct link between supply risk and macroeconomic plus social risk when diversified routes or secure interconnections are absent. The text states that price surges and availability shocks do not remain theoretical debates but instead appear as household affordability crises, industrial competitiveness shocks and political stress events.
Montenegro is described as sitting at an “interesting margin” because it is smaller and less structurally dominated by gas dependence than many neighbours. Its strategic positioning is framed around potential integration rather than large consumption volumes. The material ties this integration role to emerging Southern Corridor routes and Adriatic diversification frameworks.
Transition context: renewables growth alongside continued gas use
The text places these developments within a broader shift toward a gas system described as less Russian, more flexible and structurally more expensive while remaining more secure than before. It states that South-East Europe cannot be treated differently from other regions in this transition because Europe’s security framework depends on regional integration into diversification routes, LNG-backed supply logic and coordinated resilience systems.
The future outlook described does not assume immediate disappearance of gas even as Europe accelerates renewables deployment alongside hydrogen prospects and electrification. Gas is described as remaining part of industrial continuity, heating security and transition balancing in the period ahead. The material frames Southeast Europe’s gas evolution as a strategic question extending at least through the next decade.
The text then lists conditions associated with improved positioning: completing diversification; strengthening interconnectors; unlocking Romania’s production; anchoring Greek LNG through Alexandroupolis; harmonising regulation; and normalising European gas behaviour across markets connected to SEE infrastructure.